- By: Mahmoud Hassan
The governance of the Gaza Strip on the day after the war remains a major concern for Tel Aviv, Washington and several Arab capitals, amid regional and international anticipation regarding the sustainability of the ceasefire agreement and the prisoner exchange deal between Israel and Palestinian resistance factions, mainly Hamas.
The issue of ruling Gaza after so much death and destruction is not an easy matter, given the enormous challenges and complex issues related to reconstruction, the tunnel network, the weapons of resistance groups, displacement plans, Israel’s security and US President Donald Trump’s stated plans for the enclave. All of these factors make Gaza’s governance a difficult and costly test.
There is still no clear plan, not least because of the internal Palestinian divisions that prevent the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority from taking control of the Strip. Moreover, there is Israeli and US opposition to any post-war role for Hamas, coupled with Arab reluctance to get involved in administering Gaza or confronting the resistance factions.
The situation is complicated further by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s firm stance. He has declared that “on the day after the war in Gaza, there will be neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority” in Gaza. He rejects replacing Hamas with Fatah, and has said, “I will not allow Hamastan to be replaced with Fatahstan.”
Last year, Israel attempted to rely on local tribal leaders in Gaza as a possible post-war governance option, but the lack of popular support and the growing influence of the resistance doomed this plan to failure.
Neighbouring Egypt favours the formation of an independent technocrat committee to administer Gaza, to be established by a Palestinian presidential decree and under a framework of Palestinian consensus. This approach would ensure that the governance structure for the “day after” remains Palestinian while also fulfilling Israel’s demand to exclude Hamas from power.
This decision appears to be a tactical move to avoid external pressure. However, Netanyahu seeks to go beyond simply side-lining Hamas; he is calling for its leaders to be deported and for the disarmament of its military wing, setting up significant obstacles to any potential resolution.
Complicating matters further is the stance of the Arab League, which appears to align with Israeli interests. The Assistant Secretary-General of the League, Hossam Zaki, said recently that “Palestinian interests require Hamas to exit the scene.”
Israeli rigidity and Arab alignment with this position have prompted Hamas to reaffirm its stance. Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan declared at the Al Jazeera Forum in Doha last week that, “The day after the war in Gaza will be entirely Palestinian, and Hamas will not leave Gaza under any agreements, nor will it be excluded from the Palestinian project under any pressure or implementation of external plans.” He warned further: “Anyone who replaces the Israeli occupation in Gaza or any Palestinian city will be dealt with as we deal with the occupation, through resistance. This is a settled matter and is not up for discussion.”
As soon as the ceasefire took effect, Hamas redeployed its police forces in Gaza and municipalities resumed the provision of public services for the population, demonstrating its continued governance over the Strip, where it has been in charge since winning the Palestinian election in 2006.
This reality undermines the feasibility of a proposed plan to deploy an international peacekeeping force, including Arab countries, throughout Gaza, while establishing a buffer zone in the north. Under this plan, the Palestinian Authority and the UN would assume specific roles, with private security firms overseeing aid distribution and reconstruction efforts.
The prospect of disarming the resistance seems extremely difficult, if not impossible, given the atrocities committed by Israeli forces since October, 2023. The occupation forces have killed at least 50,000 Palestinians and wounded well over 100,000 others. Palestinians know that they have to be able to defend themselves.
According to Sky News Arabia, Hamas political bureau member Muhammad Nazzal emphasised that, “Disarming the movement is not open for negotiation under any circumstances,” and asserted that “[resistance] weapons will not disappear from Gaza or any Palestinian territory until the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.”
Furthermore, the prospect of dismantling Gaza’s tunnel network or revealing its precise layout is highly unlikely. The tunnels provided a strategic advantage that played a crucial role in ensuring the resilience of the Palestinian resistance.
Palestinian affairs expert Abdel Ghani Abu Shama noted that the resistance does not trust Israel, the US or any mediators. Hamas’s ideological and religious beliefs make it unlikely to abandon its positions or relinquish resistance as a fundamental choice. “Yes,” he pointed out, “the methods may change, but the objective remains the same, from stones to knives, and from Kalashnikovs to rockets.”
Abu Shama told me that the issue of disarmament has been proposed for nearly a century — internationally, regionally and within the Arab world — yet it has always been met with Palestinian rejection. “For Palestinians, bearing arms is not a matter of prestige, but a necessity to defend themselves, their land and their sacred sites against the occupation.”
Finding a governance structure for Gaza remains an extremely complex issue, as it is nearly impossible to satisfy all parties involved. The divisions among Palestinians themselves, the rift between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, the conflict between the resistance and Israel, and the diverging interests of Arab states and the United States, particularly with Trump pushing for the displacement of Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan, all contribute to this complexity.
However, some flexibility in handling the situation could provide Israel with a long-term truce — a hudna — lasting ten years or more, along with a buffer zone, while allowing Egypt’s proposal for a technocrat committee to serve as a compromise. This would address Israel’s veto against Hamas remaining in power and its opposition to the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza.
Of course, financial and logistical concerns related to reconstruction, salaries for Gaza’s employees and humanitarian aid distribution will be subject to European and UN oversight, as well as direct supervision by regional and international mediators, including the US, Qatar and Egypt.
Observers believe that Hamas is open to comprehensive reconciliation with Fatah, a national role for the Palestinian Authority, and legislative and presidential elections, provided that any political arrangements for Gaza’s administration do not exclude it or involve its disarmament.
Hamas’s decision not to participate in governance may be a political manoeuvre or a temporary strategy to accommodate Western concerns about its continued control over Gaza. However, this does not imply its withdrawal from the Strip, acceptance of disarmament or dismantling of its military wing, according to political analyst Muhammad Jamal.
Hamas remains the key factor in Gaza’s equation, and its perspective on “the day after” must be considered. As the de facto ruling force in the Strip and the largest military faction in the resistance, any attempt to exclude it from the political landscape is unlikely to benefit Israel. There are concerns that such a move could lead to security chaos in Gaza and the rise of even more radical factions.
Gaza will remain a long-term headache, not only for Israel, but also for the entire region and the world, especially under an extremist Israeli government backed by the US. This far-right Israeli government rejects the two-state solution and embraces killing and destruction as strategic options, while facing a people who believe in their right to live on their land and see no alternative but to engage in legitimate resistance to the brutal Israeli occupation.
- Courtesy: Middle East Monitor